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INTRODUCTION
The sharing economy has much to offer women. Through this
economy, a person can be productive on a flexible schedule, outside
the rigid forty-hour workweek of a conventional job. Those who have
extra time, spare room, underutilized talents, or products they no
longer need can find markets for their surpluses, without the need for
highly capitalized corporate distribution channels.1 Buyers, too, have
more market flexibility. They have many more choices available to
them, and through auctions or other bidding devices they can
sometimes reach terms with sellers on a decentralized basis rather
than on the more customary take-it-or-leave-it basis. Participants in
the sharing economy often exchange information about each other in
order to address privacy, safety, or other concerns they might have,
and then use this information to decide with whom to do business.
The opportunities to give and receive individual feedback also allow
buyers and sellers to better evaluate the trustworthiness of their
potential trading partner or the quality of the product in advance, as
well as to express their pleasure or disappointment with a transaction.
In these ways and others, the sharing economy promotes flexibility,
*
A. Kenneth Pye Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Thanks to the
Fordham Urban Law Journal for initiating what has become for me a continuing and
fruitful interaction with Naomi Schoenbaum on issues of discrimination in the sharing
economy.
1. Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy, 43
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 34 (2016) (describing the sharing economy as “uniquely
comprised of individuals profiting from their personal excess capacity”).
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networking, trust, cooperative relationships, and communication—all
things that women are thought to especially value.2
In Gender and the Sharing Economy, Professor Schoenbaum
challenges this utopic vision. She argues that, despite the features
outlined above—indeed, to a certain extent, because of them—the
sharing economy risks deepening and legitimating gender stereotypes
and thereby harming women.3 The problem is not that the features of
the sharing economy described above are not valuable. It is that the
flexibility, connection, and trust that speak to women’s short-term
circumstances and values come at the expense of women’s more
important, long-term interest in gender equality.4
Professor Schoenbaum’s cautionary tale has several discrete and
interactive parts. First, she explains that the sharing economy is
disproportionately concentrated in intimate settings like personal
homes and cars (rather than, say, offices and stores), and in personal
services such as house-cleaning, outside chores, dog-walking,
carpooling, roommate matching, and childcare (rather than more
traditionally commodified goods and services).5 Second, the intimacy
of these transactions raises concerns by those involved in these
transactions for privacy, comfort, sexual autonomy, and safety—
concerns that tend to increase the salience of sex and, consequently,
the strength and acceptability of gender stereotypes.6 Third, the
sharing economy is more likely than traditional market transactions
to involve the exchange of personal information, which arguably
reduces transactional risk, but at the same time, again, facilitates sex
discrimination.7 Finally, the sharing economy lacks the structural
constraints, including applicable anti-discrimination laws, corporate
2. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Gender and the Sharing Economy, 43 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1023, 1024-25 (2016). Basic works in legal scholarship exploring the
traditionally female or feminine values of community relationship, trust,
interdependence, and cooperation, include Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 57 (2002); Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist
Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1 (1990);
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988). The notion that
these characteristics are women’s values, as opposed to, say, values attributed to
women to serve men’s interests, is heavily disputed within feminism. See CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 38-39
(1987) (criticizing relational feminism for “making it seem as though [traditional
feminine] attributes, with their consequences, really are somehow ours, rather than
what male supremacy has attributed to us for its own use”).
3. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1027, 1051.
4. Id. at 1051.
5. Id. at 1029-32.
6. Id. at 1038-1050.
7. Id. at 1032-35.
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enforcement structures, and worker interactions, that constrain
discrimination in traditional business.8 What Professor Schoenbaum
fears, ultimately, is that the breakdown in nondiscrimination norms in
the sharing economy will alter gender equality norms more generally,
and thus to subvert the progress society has made over the years.9
Professor Schoenbaum’s article is the first serious scholarship to
examine the sharing economy’s implications for gender equality and,
as such, makes a huge contribution to the growing literature in this
field. In this response, I offer four observations that highlight and
elaborate some of its important insights.10
I. BEYOND THE SHARING ECONOMY
Professor Schoenbaum observes that the extension of existing sex
discrimination law to the sharing economy will not necessarily
alleviate the gender issues she identifies.11 This point warrants some
emphasis and extension. A number of features of existing law detract
from the law’s ability to contain gender discrimination, even in the
traditional economy.
For example, as Professor Schoenbaum
mentions,12 current law only addresses the behavior of businesses, not
customers.13
Ordinarily, when society deems certain behavior
harmful enough, it regulates that behavior on both the demand side
and the supply side.14 Why society treats discrimination differently

8. Id. at 1058-68.
9. Id. at 1050-51.
10. Many of these insights draw from work I have done with Mitu Gulati. See
Katharine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Customers, 102 IOWA L. REV.
223 (2016).
11. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, 1063-68.
12. Id. 1063, 1065.
13. Theoretically, section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866., 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(2012), prohibits race discrimination by individuals and business entities alike, but
section 1981 does not concern gender and, in any event, has not generated
discrimination suits against individual customers. See Bartlett & Gulati, supra note
10. All other civil rights statutes regulate only the behavior of providers, not
customers, and even then, apply only when the business reaches a certain size, as
determined by the number of employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2)(B)(ii) (year)
(stating that the Family and Medical Leave Act is not applicable to businesses with
less than fifty employees); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (2012) (exempting establishments
with not more than five rooms in which owner is a resident from prohibition against
discrimination in places of public accommodation); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012)
(stating that employment discrimination law is applicable to employers with fifteen or
more employees); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2012) (stating prohibition of discrimination
against the disabled applicable only to employers with fifteen or more employees).
14. Examples include bribery, prostitution, transactions in body parts, illegal
drugs, and guns.
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from other harmful behaviors is beyond the scope of this response,
but the fact is that the law prohibits only business sellers from
discriminating, not individual customers.15 This matters, for while the
prohibition of discrimination by businesses makes discrimination by
customers more difficult, there are still plenty of opportunities for
customers, both online and in brick-and-mortar stores, to make
discriminatory choices about with whom to do business,16 how much
to pay17 or tip,18 and how to evaluate the service they received.19
Other limitations of anti-discrimination law also affect the law’s
ability to contain sex discrimination in both traditional and online
economies. For example, the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) exception to Title VII allows employers to make sex-based
distinctions that they believe are essential to their businesses.20 These
distinctions are often grounded in the discriminatory preferences of

15. For more detailed examination of the question of discrimination by
customers, including possible rationales for existing law, see Bartlett & Gulati, supra
note 10.
16. See Jennifer L. Doleac & Luke C.D. Stein, The Visible Hand: Race and
Online Market Outcomes, 123 ECON. J. F469, F470 (2013) (explaining a study of
online sales of iPods showed that iPods depicted in white hands sold far better than
iPods in black hands); Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing
Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., Apr.
2017, at 1 (showing that Airbnb guests with distinctively African-American names
are roughly sixteen percent less likely to be accepted by hosts than identical guests
not identifiable as non-white).
17. See, e.g., Ian Ayres et al., Race Effects on eBay, 46 RAND J. ECON. 891, 891
(2015) (showing that baseball cards depicted in a black hand sold for twenty percent
less than the same cards in a white hand); Benjamin G. Edelman & Michael Luca,
Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com, (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper,
No. 14-054, 2014), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/digital-discrimination-the-case-ofairbnb-com [https://perma.cc/F3Z5-D7CG] (showing non-black hosts on Airbnb get
twelve percent more than black hosts for comparable property).
18. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab
Tipping, 114 YALE L.J. 1613 (2005) (discussing a study of over 1,000 taxicab trips in
New Haven found that customers tip African-American cab drivers one-third less
than white cab drivers and stiff them eighty percent more often); Matthew Parrett,
Customer Discrimination in Restaurants: Dining Frequency Matters, 32 J. LABOR
RES. 87 (2011) (discussing a study of data collected outside five Virginia restaurants
found that customers tip female servers less than men, unless their customers are
regular patrons or the service quality is exceptional).
19. See Bryce Covert, Female Client Service Reps Get Lower Scores Despite
Better Performance and Experience, THINKPROGRESS (May 22, 2014),
http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2014/05/22/3440725/wordstream/ [https://perma.cc/
63Z4-ACGM] (discussing a study of customer representative evaluations showing
that female marketers are undervalued by twenty-one percent).
20. See Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 10.
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customers and, in turn, help to perpetuate those preferences.21
Similarly, not all public accommodations laws prohibit sex-exclusive
policies even in traditional business settings such as women’s gyms,
public bathrooms, and “ladies nights,” especially where these
exclusions are supported by widespread customer preferences—
preferences that are, as a consequence, reinforced.22
The barriers courts have imposed to the enforcement of Title VII’s
prohibition of disparate impact discrimination also limit the
obligation of both online and traditional businesses to avoid practices
that have a discriminatory impact on their employees or customers.23
Moreover, no law prevents, or could prevent, businesses from
marketing goods and services in ways that reinforce gender
stereotypes, both online and in traditional business.24
I mean simply to emphasize Professor Schoenbaum’s point that the
discrimination problems raised by the sharing economy will not be
resolved simply by extending existing law to that economy. There are
long-standing realities and legal barriers that make it difficult to
contain sex discrimination in whichever economy it functions.
II. BEYOND INTIMACY
For Professor Schoenbaum, the intimacy of services and
transactions in the sharing economy makes sex salient, and that
21. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding exclusion of
women as guards in high-security men’s prisons); Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.,
391 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding sex as a BFOQ in case in which only women
were hired to guard female prisoners); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F.
Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff’d mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979) (upholding hiring
of only female nurses as a BFOQ when nursing home’s residents strenuously
objected to male nurses). These precedents are eroding. See, e.g., Breiner v. Nev.
Dep’t of Corr., 601 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting BFOQ for female guards in
female prisons); Slivka v. Camden-Clark Mem’l Hosp., 594 S.Ed.2d 616 (W. Va.
2004) (striking down hospital policy of hiring only female obstetric nurses).
22. For an analysis of ladies’ nights, see RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RIGHTS
GONE WRONG: HOW LAW CORRUPTS THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2012).
23. See Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 10.
24. See Emma Gray, ‘This Oppresses Women’ Stickers Give Body-Shaming Ads
The Edit They So Desperately Need, HUFFPOST WOMEN (June 22, 2015)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/22/this-oppresses-women-stickers-shut-downsexist-nyc-ads_n_7637564.html [https://perma.cc/H5S5-659R]; Amanda Scherker, 14
Times Women Were Sexed Up For Absolutely No Logical Reason, HUFFPOST
WOMEN (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/17/women-sexistmedia_n_5792960.html [https://perma.cc/4XTA-RTKP]; Anita Little, Top Five Sexist
Super Bowl Ads, 2013, MS. BLOG (Feb. 4, 2013), http://msmagazine.com/blog/
2013/02/04/top-five-sexist-super-bowl-ads-2013/ [https://perma.cc/4XTA-RTKP]; see
also Sexist Advertising, PINTEREST, https://www.pinterest.com/jarrahpenguin/sexistadvertising/ [https://perma.cc/NUP3-QH89].

1168

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIII

salience then facilitates and legitimates gender stereotyping.25
Professor Schoenbaum associates this greater intimacy with the
blurring of lines between home, workplace, and the market.26 The
traditional market paradigm, Professor Schoenbaum asserts, was
based on clear divisions between these three domains. In breaking
down these clear divisions, the sharing economy has brought the
market into intimacy and intimacy into the market.27
While the breakdown in boundaries between home, workplace,
and market that Professor Schoenbaum associates with intimacy is a
significant factor that impacts gender stereotypes in the sharing
economy, it is not the only one. Another breakdown that complicates
the regulatory picture is the blurring of the traditional line between
buyers and sellers.
In the traditional economy, parties to a
transaction are either sellers (usually businesses) or buyers (usually
individuals). In the online, sharing world, platforms do not sell, in the
traditional sense; rather, they match sellers with buyers. In this world,
sellers and buyers are both customers of the platforms, and therefore
not subject to the anti-discrimination laws applicable to business
sellers in traditional markets.28
Lending Club, for example, matches borrowers and “investors.”29
By law, lenders may not discriminate in their lending practices.30 Yet
because Lending Club only matches individual customers with money
to invest with individual customers who need money, it is not clear
who, if anyone, is to be regulated.31 Similarly, Airbnb hosts are
customers of the platform just as guests are, with neither subject to
anti-discrimination rules with respect to their online transaction with
each other.32 This role confusion does not depend upon the intimacy
of the goods or services made available; it applies as much to Lending
Club and eBay as to Match.com. Yet it may be a very significant

25. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1036-46.
26. Id. at 1029-30.
27. Id. at 1029-32.
28. See Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 10.
29. See LENDINGTREE, https://www.lendingtree.com/ [https://perma.cc/GTG5EQRH].
30. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691f (2012).
31. See Kadhim Shubber, Lenders Can’t Discriminate, But What About
Investors?, FT ALPHAVILLE (Jan. 13, 2016), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/01/13/
2150093/lenders-cant-discriminate-but-what-about-investors/ [https://perma.cc/QL6SFAGM].
32. See supra notes 16-17 (documenting discrimination by both hosts and guests
on Airbnb).
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factor in the sharing economy’s ability to evade anti-discrimination
rules.
III. BEYOND CHOICE
The sharing economy proliferates choices for its participants; this
is, indeed, one of its most appealing features. Among the valuable
take-aways from Professor Schoenbaum’s article, however, is the
reminder that what may increase choice for some may decrease it for
others.33
Importantly, the effects of choice are not random.
Although many of Professor Schoenbaum’s choices involve female
consumers choosing female providers, the main consequence of the
dynamic she describes is that customers devalue women in the online
marketplace.34
As Professor Schoenbaum points out, the trade-off between choice
and nondiscrimination values exists, as well, within the traditional
economy.35 Two things drive the trade-off in the sharing economy
further away from nondiscrimination values in the direction of greater
choice. First, as Professor Schoenbaum points out,36 the sharing
economy lacks the institutional structures, such as corporate equal
employment opportunity (EEO) procedures, worker interactions, and
systems of accountability, that the traditional economy relies upon to
contain discrimination.37
Second—and, here, I speculate—the exploding availability of
online choices can be expected to strengthen the value attached to
choice. Insofar as norms are socially constructed through societal
practices, laws, and relationships, what we get used to often becomes
what we expect, and thus what we value. There is indirect evidence
for this phenomenon in the research suggesting that studying
economics, which assumes people make rational, self-interested
decisions, makes people more self-interested—or selfish—in their
everyday behaviors.38 In the same way, accustoming customers to

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Schoenbaum, supra note 2, 1054.
See supra notes 18-21.
Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1054.
Id. at 1038.
Id. at 1038, 1063-68.

The literature is massive on this point. See, e.g., Robert H. Frank et al., Does
Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 159 (1993) (supporting
the hypothesis that economics are more likely to free ride and that lower levels in
cooperativeness by economists can be explained, in part, by their training);
Long Wang et al., Economics Education and Greed, 10 ACAD. MGMT. & EDUC. 643
(2011) (reporting studies showing that economics majors kept more money for
themselves in money allocation task and that economics students showed more
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endless choices through the sharing economy can be expected to
normalize and heighten the value society places on choice.
Accordingly, users in the online economy can be expected to place
increasing value on choice, at the expense of values deemphasized in
this economy, like nondiscrimination.
These institutional and expressive dimensions work together. The
sharing economy raises the societal commitment to choice, at the
same time that it fails to provide a substitute for the regularized
procedures and institutions that are used to discourage discriminatory
choices in traditional markets.
IV. BEYOND ANTI-STEREOTYPING
Professor Schoenbaum takes the position that all sex-based
stereotypes should be eliminated, whether or not they serve women’s
present interests.39 Any compromise on this, she suggests, ultimately
undermines women’s long-term interests in sex equality.40
Specifically, she disapproves of allowing women to exercise a
discriminatory preference for a female gynecologist,41 housekeeper,42
or cab driver.43
Insofar as the market for many services in which people are likely
to have a sex-based preference is expanding through the sharing
economy—this is a fundamental proposition of the article, although
not one that Professor Schoenbaum is able to quantify—it seems
correct that the sharing economy will increase sex-based
discrimination. Still, I wonder—and perhaps this makes me an
example of the diminishing commitment to eliminating gender
stereotypes that Professor Schoenbaum warns us about44—if an

positive attitudes toward greed). There is some dispute about the extent to which the
higher amount of free riding among economics students is a result of economic
training and how much is a function of the characteristics of those who decide to
major in economics. See Yoram Bauman & Elaina Rose, Selection or Indoctrination:
Why Do Economics Students Donate Less Than the Rest?, 79 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 318 (2011).
39. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, 1054-57.
40. Id. at 1054-55.
41. Id. at 1054.
42. Id. at 1055-56.
43. Id. at 1048-49, 1053.
44. I have been, in the past, a strong proponent of the elimination of all sex-based
distinctions. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 829 (1990); Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and
Appearances Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 2541 (1994); Katharine T. Bartlett, Unconstitutionally Male?: The Story of
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approach that rules all sex-based choices out of bounds is the wisest
course.
My concerns are based, in part, on principle. Women have reasons,
rooted in the here and now, for preferring women cab drivers,
household workers, masseuses, and even gynecologists. We can say,
as Professor Schoenbaum does,45 that society’s focus should be on
making women safer and more comfortable with male providers, not
avoiding them, and I would agree. But, under present circumstances,
it is not a fully satisfactory strategy. Facing real vulnerability, if
women’s autonomy means anything, it should include being able to
make their own decisions about how to secure their own comfort and
safety. In other words, women must have the tools to negotiate their
real lives, not their ideal ones.
Other concerns are strategic. On the negative side, social science
research suggests that anti-discrimination mandates that too deeply
offend a person’s sense of identity and selfhood can be
counterproductive, reinforcing rather than correcting the underlying
discriminatory impulses that drive, explicitly and implicitly,
discriminatory behavior.46 The extent of that offense and its potential
to undermine society’s ongoing commitment to ending discrimination
is disturbingly evident in the 2016 presidential campaign cycle.47
On the positive side, some sex-based preferences have helped to
create markets that have long been discriminatory—including,
presumably, the preferences for female gynecologists to which
Professor Schoenbaum refers.48 The ability to make consumer
decisions that are sex-based, but deliberately designed to undermine
sexism, is also apparent in well-known examples of collective, genderbased consumer action, such as the “girlcott” organized against

United States v. Virginia, in WOMEN AND THE LAW: STORIES 133 (Elizabeth M.
Schneider & Stephanie M. Wildman eds., 2011).
45. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, 1056-57.
46. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical
Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV.
1893, 1936-41 (2009).
47. See Andrew Rosenthal, Donald Trump’s Critics Aren’t ‘Politically Correct.’
They’re Outraged, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE (Aug. 27, 2015),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/27/donald-trumps-critics-arentpolitically-correct-theyre-outraged/?module=BlogPost-ReadMore&version=Blog 20
Main&action=Click&pgtype=Blogs&region=Body
[https://perma.cc/2EKF-B2CA]
(noting the appeal of Trump to those who “resent being called to account for
intolerance and discrimination”).
48. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, 1054.
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Abercrombie & Fitch to combat the negative female body images
fostered in the company’s advertising campaigns of the 1990s.49
The lines between “good” sex-based choices and “bad” ones are
hard to draw. I think, though, that a focus on these lines and their
malleability is likely to be more productive, long-term, than an
ironclad rule that admits of no short-term, sex-based preferences.
CONCLUSION
Professor Schoenbaum closes by saying that she is not opposed to
the sharing economy but instead seeks measures that might mitigate
its burdens to women’s equality. To be realistic, there is no turning
back from the sharing economy. The sharing economy is no more
likely to be curtailed because of the enhanced risks of discrimination
than advances in information technology are likely to be reversed
because of the incursions these advances represent to citizen
privacy.50 All we can hope for are measures that mediate its worst
effects.
Among the concrete suggestions Professor Schoenbaum offers for
further consideration are a limit on online disclosures of the kind of
identifying information that allows users of the sharing economy to
discriminate based on sex,51 and the imposition of greater burdens on
online platforms to anticipate and prevent discrimination by its
users.52 These will be difficult reforms to enact. If Professor
Schoenbaum is right, the sharing economy exerts subtle pressure to
expand the BFOQ exception to Title VII, not make it more
restrictive.53 Moreover, as I argued above, as people become more
accustomed to the choice and flexibility offered through the sharing
economy, the resistance to limits on those choices is sure to increase.

49. See Lauren Johnson, Abercrombie & Fitch Supports Racism, Sexism and Size
Discrimination, BEUTIFUL (May 10, 2013), http://www.beutifulmagazine.com/2013/05/

10/abercrombie-fitch-supports-racism-sexism-size-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/
QNR9-4UQG].
50. See generally TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE (Philip E.
Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1998); see also The Fundamental Limits of Privacy For
Social Networks, MIT TECH. REV (May 5, 2010), http://www.technologyreview.com/
view/418819/the-fundamental-limits-of-privacy-for-social-networks/ [https://perma.cc/
D7SZ-QPDG] (arguing that using social networks to make recommendations will
always compromise privacy).
51. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1069.
52. Id. at 1069-70. For further suggestions along these lines, see Bartlett & Gulati,
supra note 10.
53. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, 1064-65.
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Professor Schoenbaum helpfully places the supposed advantages of
the sharing economy in the context of the enhancement of gender
stereotyping that this economy encourages. It is hard to know how to
get a handle on the problem she identifies, given the momentum of
the forces behind it. Nevertheless, we cannot address the problem
until we understand it. Professor Schoenbaum has brought us a long
way toward that understanding.

